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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the political collapse of the 90’s, and in particular since the bicameral commission
experience of the 1997, Italian governments have always tried to face the need for wide
constitutional reform. A reduction in the number of deputies and senators was planned
several times. Esposito (2008) tells the history of the creation of this chamber. These
proposed modiﬁcations to the Senate never saw the light, as the equilibrium formed by the
several political colors in the assembly forbade it. The ﬁnal shape of the Senate was just a
copy of the Chamber of Deputies, with a smaller number of members proportionate to the
population plus a maximum of 5 honoriﬁc senators named by the President of the Republic
for a life time as well as all former Presidents of the Republic (who are senators by right).
The functions of this second chamber are identical to the ones of the ﬁrst: elaborate,
discuss and approve new laws at the national level. The only diﬀerence is the election of the
senators on a regional basis. The original version of article 56 of the Italian Constitution,
ruling the composition of the Chamber of Deputies, says that these are elected at a rate
of one every 80.000 inhabitants or a fraction larger than 40.000. Article 57, that explains
the constitution of the Senate, gives one senator every 200.000 people or a fraction larger
than 100.000 to every region. Some minima were guaranteed to every region, in particular
one senator ﬁxed for the Aosta Valley and there is a minimum of six senators for all other
regions.
The introduction of Molise in 1963 gave two senators to this region (and raised the
minimum of the other regions to seven). 1963 is also the year of a reform concerning the
apportionment of the seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The size
of the two assemblies were adjusted respectively to 630 and 315 members (plus honoriﬁc
senators). The method chosen for the apportionment of the seats between the regions was
the method of integers combined with the highest remainders: in other words, apportion
to each region a number of seats equal to the whole number contained in each region’s
fair share with the remaining seats allocated to the regions with the highest remainders1.
The minimum number of seats increased from six to seven. In January 17th 2000 a new
constitutional law introduced the Abroad constituency, modifying the articles 48, 56 and
57 of the Constitution, ensuring twelve seats at the Chamber of Deputies and six seats at
1This method, called Hamilton method, was used for the U.S. house of representatives between 1850 and
1890.
2t h eS e n a t et ot h i sn e wr e g i o n .
In October 17th 2007 the commission for constitutional aﬀairs of the Chamber of
Deputies approved a new proposal implying a wide change of the Senate functions. Regional
competencies are in some way resurrected, and the apportionment rule deeply changed. The
legislator did not decide to build a Senate like the one of the United States, with an identical
representation of the States or the Regions, but he/she did not opt for a proportional rule
either. Schematically, article 3 of the text, replacing article 57 of the Constitution, gives
a ﬁxed number of seats to every region, this number increases whenever the population
rises above a certain threshold. A total of six seats is allocated to regions with less than
one million inhabitants, nine seats to the ones smaller than three million people, eleven to
regions not bigger than ﬁve million citizens, twelve to the ones smaller than seven million
and fourteen to the others2. Two senators are allocated both to Aosta Valley and Molise,
and six both to Trentino-Alto Adige and to Italians resident abroad. The size of the Sen-
ate would become a variable (according to the population of the diﬀerent regions), if the
proposal becomes law. With the data of the last census, the number of senators would be
186.
Then we face two situations for the Senate, the actual one, which nearly corresponds to
the situation of 1963, except for the Abroad citizens, and the proposal, approved October
17th 2007, which would modify not only the number of seats but as well the relative appor-
tionment between the regions (the comparison of these two apportionments is presented in
table 1).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the fairness of this reform proposal. The idea
of power which derives from cooperative game theory is used to compare the actual case
with the proposed one. This theory shows that there exists an important diﬀerence between
the number of seats of a player (here an Italian region) and his/her inﬂuence in a voting
situation. The classical example is the majority election where an individual gets 50 seats,
another one gets 49 seats and the third one gets 1 seat. A coalition is winning if it contains
at least two individuals since the sum of seats is greater than 50 and loosing otherwise. The
power of an individual depends on his/her importance in a coalition. If a winning coalition
becomes a losing coalition whenever he/she leaves it, then we say that he/she has power. In
2Some senators would be elected by the Regional Council and some by the Council of the local autonomies,
elected by the regional populations.
3such situation, the individual is said to be a swing player. Several power indices have been
proposed in the literature (see for example Felsenthal and Machover 1998, or Laruelle 1998
for a clear presentation) and all of them take into account this notion of a swing player in
various forms. In this paper, because of theoretical reasons, we only use the Banzhaf (1965)
power index which we describe in the second section. Actually, the voting situation is a
two-step vote like in the U.S. presidential election or in the European Council: every citizen
of a region votes for senators and, in the second step, every senator votes on the laws. An
important assumption is that all the senators belonging to a same region have the same
preferences, that is to say we suppose that every region has only one senator who has several
votes. This assumption seems to be strong but enables us to compute the power a priori
and the result of the election is not considered here. Moreover, the new proposal intends
to build a Senate with regional competencies: the assumption that senators belonging to
diﬀerent parties but to the same region can vote in the same way now makes sense. To
be a swing player, an individual has to be a swing player in his/her region and the region
has to be a swing region from the national point of view. Theoretical recommendations are
presented in Barth´ el´ emy and Martin (2007, 2008) for using the Banzhaf index in a two-step
vote when the seats are allocated following a method of proportionality, which is the case
in the actual Italian situation. Our goal is not, like Balinski and Young (2001), to take into
account the ideal situation of “one man-one vote” but to compare the actual apportionment
and the proposal with a situation where every Italian citizen gets the same power, whatever
region he/she happens to live in. This last situation is the ideal situation in terms of power.
Note that in the two situations that we compare, the actual situation and the proposed
amendment, the seats are given.
Two diﬀerent majority rules are considered in computing the power indices: the simple
majority of the members of the Senate, used for simple laws, and 2/3 majority, used to
enact constitutional reforms. A similar approach is presented in Barth´ el´ emy and Martin
(2008) for the U.S. presidential election. We will see that the hypothetical reform would be
worse than the ideal situation and the actual situation.
Section 2 presents the concept of power that is widely used in the literature, section 3
provides our main results and section 4 concludes.
42 The concept of power
Cooperative game theory proposes an important concept of power. The idea is simple: if a
player (an individual, a city, a country or, like in this paper, Italian regions...) belongs to a
winning coalition, that is to say a group of players which can impose a decision, for example
a majority, and if he/she leaves this coalition it becomes a losing one, then it means that
this player has some power. We say that he/she is a swing player. If this player leaves the
winning coalition and this coalition is still winning, the power of this player is null (in this
coalition). To present more formally the concept of power, it is useful to recall the idea of
a weighted game, which is a particular voting game.
Let a the number of seats and ai the number of seats of the player i and a =
n
i=1 ai,
with n the number of players. A weighted game is [q;a1,...,a n], where q, called the quota,
is an integer. A winning coalition S (written S ∈ W, with W the set of winning coalitions)
is a group of players such that




The most famous voting game is the majority game, which perfectly corresponds to the
method used in Italian Senate, where q = a
2+1ifa is even and q = a+1
2 if a is odd. Actually,
if the majority game is often used in the Senate, the 2/3 rule is used too (q =2 /3a). We
only consider these two quotas in this paper.
Once the weighted game is deﬁned, we can present the Banzhaf index. Firstly, one has
to determine all 2n − 1 possible coalitions (non empty) and the number of times for which
player i is a swing player. If this number is divided by 2n−1 (that is the number of coalitions
containing player i), we obtain the non-normalized Banzhaf power index and if it is divided
by the total numbers of swing players, we obtain the normalized Banzhaf power index. The
formula of the normalized Banzhaf power index (always used in this paper) for player i is
βi =
n u m b e ro ft i m e sii sas w i n gp l a y e r









where v(S)=1i fS ∈ W and v(S)=0o t h e r w i s e . N o t et h a t[ v(S) − v(S\{i})] is
diﬀerent from 0 only if the player i is a swing player in S.
5Consider the following example: let a 3-player majority game [6;5,4,2]. The diﬀerent
coalitions are {1},{2}, {3}, {1,2},{1,3}, {2,3} and {1,2,3}, the swing players are under-
lined. For example, in coalition {1,2}, if one player leaves it, then it becomes losing. Thus
the two players are both swing players. We obtain βi =1 /3, for i =1 ,2,3. We can compute
the Banzhaf index as the probability that player i is a swing player (for a presentation of
the probabilistic interpretation, see Straﬃn 1977).
The literature proposes several power indices with associate normative properties (for
a presentation of power indices, see for example Felsenthal and Machover 1998 or Laruelle
1998). However, our choice of the Banzhaf index is theoretic. It is shown, as described in
the introduction, that this is the appropriate power index in a two-step game (the citizens
vote for the senators and then the senators vote on legislation) when the seats are allocated
proportionately. Some arguments are presented in Barth´ el´ emy and Martin (2008). Our
purpose is to show that the reform proposal, that is to say the new apportionment in the
Italian Senate, is not fair in terms of power. The power of an individual is the probability
that he/she is a swing player in his/her region and the region is a swing player in the Senate.
The Italian situation is diﬀerent from the U.S. “winner-take-all” situation: indeed, a region
gets several senators and their preferences may be diﬀerent. However, in this paper, we
compute the power a priori and thus we assume that all the senators in a given region
vote the same way. The ideal situation is certainly the one where every citizen in Italy gets
the same power, wherever he/she leaves. Our purpose is then diﬀerent from the classical
problem of apportionment, widely studied by Balinski and Young (2001), where the goal is
meeting the ideal of “one man, one vote”.
3R e s u l t s
In this section we compare the actual seats apportioned and the proposed reform. This
comparison is made on the basis of the relative power of each region. The power is computed
using the Banzhaf power index developed in section 2. The ideal situation corresponds to
the case where each citizen has the same amount of power. Whatever the region, the ideal
power for each citizen is equal to 1
59533387. In this ideal case, the same population in each
region implies the same power for all the regions (as the power is expressed in a relative
way, this would lead to a power of 1/21 for each of the 21 regions). As shown in table 1,
6the populations are not equal3 which implies mechanically a diﬀerent power for each region.
For instance, the ideal power for Lombardy is 9032554
59533387 =1 5 .17%, while for the Aosta Valley
it is 119548
59533387 =0 .20% (see table 1, columns ‘Population’ and ‘Ideal’). This ideal power is
directly computed using the relative population of each region under the assumption that
each citizen has the same power.
The seats apportioned (those we observe in practice) should lead to power as close as
possible to the ideal one described above. The two apportionments compared in this article
are:
- the actual one (‘Act.’ in table 1), with a total of 315 seats,
- the proposed one (‘Prop.’ in table 1), with a total of 186 seats.
First of all, the new proposition modiﬁes the relative distribution of seats. For instance,
with 47 seats over a total number of 315 Lombardy has 14.92% of the seats but only 7.53%
under the new proposal (14 seats over 185). With less seats, 11 against 18, the proportion
would be higher for the Tuscany, going from 5.71% to 5.91%. The eﬀect is more important
for the Abroad citizens region, where the number of seats is constant and even more for the
Aosta Valley. More generally, the modiﬁcation of the apportionment reinforces the relative
number of seats for the smallest regions in terms of population (all the regions with less
than 3500000 citizens).
Given these two apportionments, we can compute the power of each region. With
the actual apportionment, the power of each region looks similar to the theoretical power
except for the six smallest regions and for the Abroad citizens region. With the modiﬁed
apportionment, the situation is clearly diﬀerent. Indeed, the power is higher than the
theoretical one for the smallest regions, and lower for the largest regions. These eﬀects
are underlined in ﬁgure 1 which represents a (continuous) scatter plot of the power for the
actual, proposed and ideal cases as a function of the region population in proportion.
By construction, the ideal case curve (dotted) corresponds to the 45-degree line. Hence,
we may compare the two other power curves (‘Actual’ and ‘Proposed’) to this reference line.
When the curve is similar to the reference line, the power is not far from the ideal situation
where each Italian citizen has the same power. On the contrary, the greater the distance
from this line, the more unequal is citizen power. The ‘Actual’ curve is quite closed to the
3The 2001 population is used in this paper.
7reference line except for two regions: Basilicata which is over the 45-degree line (an actual
power of 2.15% instead an ideal power of 1.00%) and the ﬁctive Abroad citizens region
which is under the bissectrice (an actual power of 1.84% instead an ideal power of 4.26%).
Let us remark that the pick due to the Abroad citizens region arises from the fact that this
region has a number of seats which is not proportional to its population. Moreover, the
‘Actual’ power curve without this region nearly corresponds to the ideal curve as shown in
ﬁgure 3.
The 2/3 majority case, leads to the same result, the main diﬀerence being the decrease
of the power given to the largest region, Lombardy. This implies a value under the 45-degree
line as shown in ﬁgure 2.
The power of a region is the sum of the powers of its citizens. Hence, the power of a
citizen for a given region is the power of the region divided by its population. In the ideal
case, the power of each Italian citizen is the same and is equal to 1
59533387.I n o r d e r t o
manage with this small value, the power for 100000 citizens is computed. It corresponds to
the percentage of the whole Italian power that have 100000 citizens in a given region. In
the ideal case this leads to 100000
59533387 =0 .168%, for each region, as reported in table 2, which
underlines the fact that one citizen has the same power whatever the region he/she lives in.
In practice we do not observe the ideal power value, whatever the apportionment method
applied. This table underlines the fact that the power of a citizen is dependent on the region
and on the apportionment method. For instance, with the actual apportionment, 100 000
citizens in Lombardy have a power of 0.181% (of the total power of Italy), which is more
than the ideal power mentioned above (0.168%). Moreover, the proposed apportionment
would lead to a smaller power (0.085%).
In order to compare these three columns of power (Ideal, Actual and Proposed), the
power of a citizen in a given region may be relativized by the ideal power value. Hence,
for the previous example in the actual situation, the relative value for Lombardy is 0.181
0.168 =
1.08, which means that one citizen of Lombardy has 8% of power more than what he/she
would have in the ideal situation. In the proposed situation, one Lombardian citizen has
0.085
0.168 =0 .51 of the ideal power, which means that one citizen of Lombardy has 49% of power
less than what he/she would have in the ideal situation.
The largest values for the actual situation are 2.14 for Basilicata (more than twice the
8ideal power) and 0.43 for the abroad citizens (less than half the ideal power). For the
proposed situation we get respectively 5.39 for Aosta Valley (more than ﬁve times the ideal
power) and 0.51 for Lombardy (nearly half the ideal power).
Except for the abroad citizens region, the distribution of relative power is more con-
centrated around one for the actual situation, as illustrated by ﬁgure 4, which is a way of
understanding ﬁgure 1 in a relative sense.
Instead of comparing the observed power of a citizen to the ideal one, the reference could
be the smallest observed power (for a given apportionment). Hence, for the actual situation,
we set the abroad citizens power to one, which corresponds to dividing the diﬀerent powers
by the power of an abroad citizen (this is a normalization). Then, for each region, the
power of a citizen is relativized to the reference citizen (as shown in ﬁgure 5). For instance,
a citizen of Lombardy has 0.181
0.073 =2 .50 times the power of the reference one. The power of a
citizen of Basilicata is nearly ﬁve times the reference one. These values are larger with the
proposed apportionment where the reference becomes a citizen living in Lombardy. The
power of a citizen of Aosta Valley is more than ten times the reference one (0.905
0.085 =1 0 .67).
Let us be reminded that in the actual situation, the number of seats given to the
Abroad citizens region is ﬁxed independently of its population. This implies logically that
the analysis between actual power and ideal power is biased (as presented in Figure 1 and
Figure 3). This analysis is reinforced in Figure 6 where all the ratios for the actual situation
are near one except for Basilicata. When compared to the proposed situation the gap is
more than evident.
All the previous analyzes were made for the 1
2-majority case. The results for the 2
3-
majority case are roughly the same. The power of a citizen relative to the smallest power is
lower both for the actual and the proposed situations. The only two exceptions are Molise
and the Aosta Valley.
4 Conclusions
We show in this paper that the intended reform concerning the apportionment of seats
in the Italian senate is not fair, according to the fact that every citizen in this country
should have the same power of vote, whatever the region he/she lives. This criteria is, in
our opinion, as least as important than the classical one widely described by Balinski and
9Young (20021, “one man, one vote”. Such an approach implies to use a power index and
to accept some hypothesis. For example, we assume that every senator in a same state has
the same preferences, which is a classical hypothesis in the power index theory. Indeed, we
want to compute the power a priori, and not a posteriori.
Our main result is that the proposal implies some important inequalities concerning the
individual power, inequalities which do not exist in the actual situation and the proposed
change is not recommended.
10Table 1: Power of the regions
Seats Power
Number In % 1
2-majority 2
3-majority
Region4 Population Act. Prop. Act. Prop. Ideal Act. Prop. Act. Prop.
Lombardy 9 032 554 47 14 14.92 7.53 15.17 16.39 7.67 13.89 7.35
Campania 5 701 931 30 12 9.52 6.45 9.58 9.53 6.48 9.59 6.40
Lazio 5 112 413 27 12 8.57 6.45 8.59 8.53 6.48 8.63 6.40
Sicily 4 968 991 26 11 8.25 5.91 8.35 8.18 5.94 8.32 5.88
Veneto 4 527 694 24 11 7.62 5.91 7.61 7.53 5.94 7.68 5.88
Piedmont 4 214 677 22 11 6.98 5.91 7.08 6.86 5.94 7.06 5.88
Apulia 4 020 707 21 11 6.67 5.91 6.75 6.53 5.94 6.75 5.88
Emilia-Rom. 3 983 346 21 11 6.67 5.91 6.69 6.53 5.94 6.75 5.88
Tuscany 3 497 806 18 11 5.71 5.91 5.88 5.58 5.94 5.77 5.88
Calabria 2 011 466 10 9 3.17 4.84 3.38 3.09 4.81 3.23 4.89
Sardinia 1 631 880 99 2.86 4.84 2.74 2.78 4.81 2.91 4.89
Liguria 1 571 783 89 2.54 4.84 2.64 2.46 4.81 2.59 4.89
Marche 1 470 581 89 2.54 4.84 2.47 2.46 4.81 2.59 4.89
Abruzzo 1 262 392 79 2.22 4.84 2.12 2.15 4.81 2.26 4.89
Friuli-Venezia 1 184 764 79 2.22 4.84 1.99 2.15 4.81 2.26 4.89
Trentino-Alto 940 016 76 2.22 3.23 1.58 2.15 3.18 2.26 3.31
Umbria 825 826 76 2.22 3.23 1.39 2.15 3.18 2.26 3.31
Basilicata 597 768 76 2.22 3.23 1.00 2.15 3.18 2.26 3.31
Molise 320 601 22 0.63 1.08 0.54 0.62 1.08 0.64 1.03
Aosta Valley 119 548 12 0.32 1.08 0.20 0.31 1.08 0.32 1.03
Abroad 2 536 643 66 1.90 3.23 4.26 1.84 3.18 1.94 3.31
Total 59 533 387 315 186 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
11Table 2: Power of the citizens in the 1
2-majority case
Power for 100 000 Power relative to the
citizens (in %) ideal power∗ smallest power∗∗
Region Ideal Actual Prop. Actual Prop. Actual Prop.
Lombardy 0.168 0.181 0.085 1.08 0.51 2.50 1.00
Campania 0.168 0.167 0.114 1.00 0.68 2.30 1.34
Lazio 0.168 0.167 0.127 0.99 0.75 2.30 1.49
Sicily 0.168 0.165 0.120 0.98 0.71 2.26 1.41
Veneto 0.168 0.166 0.131 0.99 0.78 2.29 1.55
Piedmont 0.168 0.163 0.141 0.97 0.84 2.24 1.66
Apulia 0.168 0.163 0.148 0.97 0.88 2.23 1.74
Emilia-Romagna 0.168 0.164 0.149 0.98 0.89 2.26 1.76
Tuscany 0.168 0.159 0.170 0.95 1.01 2.19 2.00
Calabria 0.168 0.154 0.239 0.92 1.42 2.11 2.81
Sardinia 0.168 0.170 0.294 1.01 1.75 2.34 3.47
Liguria 0.168 0.157 0.306 0.93 1.82 2.16 3.60
Marche 0.168 0.168 0.327 1.00 1.95 2.30 3.85
Abruzzo 0.168 0.171 0.381 1.02 2.27 2.35 4.48
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.168 0.182 0.406 1.08 2.41 2.50 4.78
Trentino-Alto Adige/Sudtirol 0.168 0.229 0.338 1.36 2.01 3.15 3.98
Umbria 0.168 0.261 0.385 1.55 2.29 3.59 4.53
Basilicata 0.168 0.360 0.532 2.14 3.17 4.95 6.26
Molise 0.168 0.192 0.338 1.14 2.01 2.64 3.98
Aosta Valley 0.168 0.257 0.905 1.53 5.39 3.54 10.67
Abroad 0.168 0.073 0.125 0.43 0.75 1.00 1.48
∗ Illustrated in ﬁgure 4 ∗∗ Illustrated in ﬁgure 5
12Figure 1. Power of the regions in the 1
2-majority case
13Figure 2. Power of the regions in the 2
3-majority case
14Figure 3. Power of the regions in the 1


































































































Figure 6: actual and proposed power computed relatively to their smallest value 
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